Looking for answers to Greece’s impossible multiple choice

Illustration by Manos Symeonakis

Greece is trying to complete a multiple-choice test in which all the answers are wrong. Sunday’s elections could have hardly produced a more fragmented result, one from which you can add up the numbers any way you want but not get the response you’re looking for. Efforts to form a unity government are due to fall flat — barring a last-minute successful intervention from President Karolos Papoulias. They seemed doomed to failure because none of the parties are taking on board constructive messages from the election result.

Representatives of the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) and the Independent Greeks, as well as others, have suggested that Sunday’s outcome is proof that 68 percent of voters reject the terms of the EU-IMF bailout. In fact, so emboldened by his party’s remarkable surge to 16.78 percent, SYRIZA leader Alexis Tsipras is poised to write to EU officials to declare the loan deal null and void because of the way people voted on Sunday. This is presumptuous on behalf of the leftist leader.

It’s true that PASOK and New Democracy, the two that signed the latest loan agreement, only gathered a combined record low of 32 percent but that doesn’t mean that every other vote was cast as a flat rejection of the bailout mechanism.

Democratic Left, which won 6.11 percent of the vote, has asked for Greece to disengage from the memorandum but has not asked for an immediate rejection. After all, remaining in the eurozone is one of the party’s red lines. That’s why its leader, Fotis Kouvelis, has given only qualified support to Tsipras, saying he would back a SYRIZA administration only if it’s a majority government.

Tsipras also includes in his calculations the unusually high number of votes that went to parties that failed to enter Parliament. This reached 19 percent but cannot be claimed, en masse, as an anti-bailout block. In fact, it includes three liberal parties — Drasi, Democratic Alliance and Dimiourgia Xana (Creativity Again) — that have not called for the EU-IMF memorandum to be scrapped straight away. Combined, support for these parties accounts for 6.5 percent of the vote. In fact, two of these parties, Drasi and Democratic Alliance, are reported to be in talks to join forces if new elections are held.

Then there is the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), which gained 2.9 percent on Sunday. LAOS backed the first memorandum but bailed out of the coalition government in February before having to vote in favor of the second loan deal. The quixotic nature of its leader, Giorgis Karatzaferis, means that there is no guarantee LAOS would gravitate to an anti-memorandum camp.

The largest party to fail to enter Parliament was the Ecologist Greens with 2.93 percent. Tsipras met with the EcoGreens on Tuesday and his attempt to attract their support was rebuffed. “We can’t hide behind an anti-memorandum framework,” said party leader Ioanna Kontouli. “Our proposals don’t just say ‘no’, they also provide a roadmap for exiting the crisis,” she added, in what is likely to be the most mature and incisive comment of this post-election period.

That leaves SYRIZA to count on the support of 20 tiny parties ranging from Marxist-Leninists to a joke group that had a porn star as its leading candidate. The largest of these parties is the anti-capitalist ANTARSYA, which drew 1.19 percent of the vote. Adding all these parties together gives you about 6.50 percent.

Given that SYRIZA would certainly not count the 7 percent of far-right Chrysi Avgi (Golden Dawn) in its anti-memorandum front, it’s hard to see how Tsipras how can claim to write to EU officials on behalf of a majority of Greek people. As tangible as people’s anger with the current situation is, the camp that has a clear anti-memorandum position does not make up a majority. Adding the percentages of SYRIZA, the Independent Greeks and the Communist Party (KKE), gives you 35.86. Even the 6.50 percent of the anti-parliamentary parties is not enough to take it over 50 percent.

There is a reason that the message from these elections is so unclear. It’s because they were not just an expression of utter frustration with the crisis and austerity measures, they also reflected Greeks’ exasperation with the two parties that governed the country since 1974.

Support for New Democracy and PASOK had been declining since 2000 but the crisis has acted as a particle accelerator for Greece’s political transition. It laid bare the lies and failures of the big two parties and made it abundantly obvious that they had run out of ideas about how to set the country on a new course and navigate through the crisis. Sunday was the first opportunity for people en masse to express disdain for ND and PASOK. Even for those who want Greece to remain in the euro (opinion polls suggest they are a clear majority) found it difficult to reward two spent and crumbling parties with their votes on Sunday. Surveys over the last few days indicate that voters fled ND and PASOK for a wide range of parties, not just those who were most vehemently opposed to the terms of the bailout.

If one were to plot a graph of these elections, the results would lie at the point where four decades of disappointment and false dawns met almost three years of crisis, recession and austerity.

SYRIZA has gained on both axes. As a relatively new party, it has not been tainted in the same way as other elements of the Greek political establishment. As a coalition, it has been able to weave together the views of Marxists and social democrats when ND and PASOK became unwieldy monoliths. Under the leadership of Alexis Tsipras, a young man in old-world Greek politics, it has been able to begin a conversation with younger voters who have been consistently ignored by other parties.

SYRIZA has also grabbed the political opportunity provided by the crisis. Tsipras has worked hard for that 16.78 percent. He has spent time with protesters on the street, with workers in factories, with struggling pensioners and the unemployed. He went to all the places that politicians from ND and PASOK feared to tread. In an environment where protest against austerity needed an outlet, SYRIZA provided it. Each tear gas canister tossed into Syntagma Square sent more voters scurrying to the leftists. Along with the Independent Greeks, they profited most from the Indignant movement last summer. When that collapsed, participants needed a new tent to gather under.

Greece is going through a complex crisis, one that is part economic, part political, part societal and part cultural. After almost three years of austerity measures, constant speculation, unending uncertainty and complex economics, many Greeks are seeking straightforward answers. SYRIZA has provided this by sticking to the position that Greece does not need to abide by the terms of its loan agreement, that it can call a debt moratorium and be given breathing space to restore its economy to growth.

What SYRIZA has not focused on is structural reforms and an overhaul of the public administration. These two issues are so inextricably linked to what led Greece to this point and where it might be able to go from here that no party can truly claim to be progressive or to reflect the wishes of the majority of Greeks unless it addresses them. Equally, SYRIZA has been just as remiss as ND and PASOK in setting out a strategy for exiting the crisis that is based on remodeling the Greek economy.

It is guilty, as the EcoGreens suggested, of overlooking all this for a hit-and-hope strategy that is based on calling the troika’s bluff. SYRIZA claims that a rejection of the bailout terms and a unilateral default would not trigger Greece’s exit from the eurozone because it would be too costly for the other members. This is the equivalent of entering a one-way street driving a clunker and not being worried about crashing into the oncoming juggernaut because it will be more expensive for the other guy to fix his vehicle. Greece cannot pin its hopes on this, nor can the election result be interpreted as advocating such tactics.

Also, there is no use in Tsipras using his exploratory mandate to appeal to unions and other groups. Greece is running out of money and anxiety about a possible euro exit is growing. A potential future prime minister should not be seen to be ignoring these concerns, especially in favor of trying to build alliances ahead of new elections. On Wednesday, the Primary School Teachers’ Federation (DOE), along with several other unions, declined to meet with Tsipras, who risks looking like a high-school kid that’s out of his depth.

His actions are fodder for New Democracy leader Antonis Samaras, who sees a risky Tsipras as a great way to rally support for his disintegrating party. Samaras will try to play on Greeks’ fears ahead of possible new elections but it’s not clear if this will be a constructive tactic for him or not. Greeks have lived through more than two years of constant fear and threats about what may be around the corner. It may be that they’re immune to it now.

Samaras also misses the message from these elections if he believes he can continue the partisan pattern of the past. Stepping up the rhetoric against the left and extending appeals to Karatzaferis and Dora Bakoyannis to return to the conservative fold reeks of desperation and regression. Samaras had a chance to show that he deserved the mantle of prime minister that he has sought since taking over ND in 2009 but he gave back the mandate to form a unity government within five hours of receiving it. If Greece is going to get a government at these or the next elections, it needs leaders who are able to compromise, collate and unite. It took Samaras just a few hours to confirm that he’s not such a leader.

If an answer to Greece’s multiple choice is to be found, then surely it must come from as many parties as possible working together on a formula to keep Greece in the euro and to relax the austerity that has a chokehold on the country’s economy. New Democracy, PASOK, Democratic Left and SYRIZA all have views on this. There is room for them to agree. It requires a level of cooperation that Greek politics has rarely known but if there is one message to take from Sunday’s results, it’s that Greeks want to leave the past behind. They’ve given their answer, it’s now up to their leaders to find a response.

Nick Malkoutzis

 

About these ads

28 responses to “Looking for answers to Greece’s impossible multiple choice

  1. Pingback: Eurozone crisis live: second attempt to form government in Greece fails | discountautoinsurances.net

  2. i propose a Europe friendly coalition headed by a new leader not been previously involved in the election process: Why not again Papademos (but leave him chose his people and do his work), why not Alekos Papadopoulos, why not Dimas?

  3. I just picked up a newspaper we had from several days before the election, Samaras’ promise not to seek a coalition splashed all over it. He comes across as such a weak leader to me, though I’m no expert. His strategy seems to be to say the same thing 1000 times, and then do the opposite thing – this is not a trustworthy strategy. (Plus I think many people have never forgiven Samaras for past sins.) I think it will be a miracle for Samaras if any of those parties (with the possible exception of LAOS) join him in his quest for a united European central-right front or whatever he calls it – the stench of ND is strong.

    Anyone can spin the election results any way they want to – and that’s what everyone is doing. I personally like the urban/provincial interpretation because it aligns with my experience – out here in the provinces, things cannot change quickly. I live in one of the prefectures that actually voted PASOK as the 1st party – and I know why – and it has nothing to do with the crisis, Venizelos, the €, or any other reason a reasonable person might think. It has to do with issues unique to this area, but the point is that these people vote PASOK and that is not going to change just because of an economic crisis.

    In speaking with people who voted for PASOK in other prefectures, my mother in law for example, all you get out of them is fear from threats, to a level that suggests brainwashing. “But who will pay wages and pensions?” It’s pathetic – when you read it, you can hear it in Venizelos’ voice, can’t you? These people who live in the provinces have been voting for ND or PASOK their entire lives, they don’t know anything different, and they can’t be expected to, really.

    One guy I know who voted for Golden Dawn – we said “since when are you a nationalist?” (he’s an immigrant to Greece, from Armenia) – he had no idea what Golden Dawn was. “I just picked the one on top.” I swear I’m not making this story up. But when we explained who they are, he still didn’t care, he just laughed about it. So maybe, like Kanakis says, the rise of GD was just a bad joke. My point though is that especially outside the urban centers it will take several elections for people to start voting on the issues and even the ideologies because many of them simply don’t do otherwise. I know a man who is so ND that he changes the channel whenever someone from another party appears on the screen. Incidentally he can’t read or write. It’s hard for people like that to change their votes from what feels ‘safe’ – how to get someone like that to think critically about their party and other parties? There is so much rhetoric thrown back and forth about respecting the elections and respecting the voters and respecting the democratic process and the message of the voters, but as I heard pointed out on NET (I think) today, the elite and the educated don’t determine the outcome.

    I also wonder how many people have thought seriously about the fact that only 2 people (out of 10,500,000) actually signed the 2nd loan agreement and not even 300 agreed to its terms. (2 people who clearly don’t have the backing of the 10,500,000.) …..sorry this is such a long comment!

  4. Pingback: Master Eurozone crisis live: Greece likely to hold new elections after second attempt to form government fails

  5. Nick:

    It’s not as complex as you think:

    1. The dilemma is with Merkel not Greece. The voters finally outsmarted Merkel by denying a coalition government in Greece (which by all counts would have been a disaster and even today continues to be a terrible idea).

    2. Greece in due time will get a single party strong government, able to conduct business as it should.

    3. SYRIZA’s voter support – in my estimation – is ephemeral. As soon as the voters figure out that the new kid on the block is not yet ready and/or can’t use the power given to him prudently, such power will be withdrawn in an instant.

    4. What happened last Sunday was a tactical move, not a substantive one. The tactical move was to call Merkel’s game and telegraph Berlin that there is no sane government in Greece (or the world for this matter) that would allow itself to willingly self-destruct in doing Merkel’s bidding. So, this coalition German-inspired business in Greece is a goner.

    5. Therefore, the next move belongs to Merkel. Kicking Greece out of the euro is totally out of the question (not only the treaties don’t allow it but no Greek would ever voluntarily commit such an act to cause loans denominated in Euros double Greece’s debt burden in an alternative currency).

    In summary: Berlin has to rethink its game, not Greece. Greece will continue to be in flux until she knows that better terms are on the table. What you saw last Sunday was not a political tectonic shift in Greece; rather the end of Berlin’s normal way of doing business as we know it.

  6. Pingback: Eurozone crisis live: Greece likely to hold new elections after second attempt to form government fails

  7. Dean, I promise you this: If and when Merkel gets voted out of office (and one day this will happen), I will give you and your tireless criticisms of her full credit for that! By the way, as important as Greek voters are for Greece, Merkel’s future is in the hands of German voters (and she has proven time and again that she knows that better than anything else).

  8. Klaus:

    Actually I will miss her when she goes. The point here is that politics are not personal; they are a matter of the state.

    Politics are an endless series of measures and counter measures until a winning position prevails.

    When an entire population is galvanized into action behind a particular proposition, we normally call such moves a check mate.

    • Dean, by now you can guess what my response to you is… If it is indeed checkmate, name me one move which the king has made (other than cutting costs) to escape checkmate. I can see nothing, nada! And there are so many moves which the king could have made (and could still make). One can’t help anyone who doesn’t want to help himself. Yes, there has been talk about HELIOS for one. Warm if not hot air. Music of the future. What matters is here and now. Not even during the recent campaign were there specific proposals for a crisis-exit plan. Just (mostly silly) rhetoric. I mean, just mandate the Athens offices of BCG, McKinsey and the likes of them and they would have first drafts of such plans and alternatives ready within weeks! What keeps responsible Greek politicians from doing what one normally does when in crisis – take action!!!

      • Klaus:

        Why would Greece make any moves to aid and abate an external power imposing terms? Name me one good reason.

        This is a 100% German/Merkel mess. Why would already suffering Greek folk contribute towards making things better for Germany?

        You broke it, you own it. (Pottery Barn rule). Germany applied the wrong medicine in Greece and now she has to pay a giant medical malpractice lawsuit. It’s that simple.

      • Dean, now you have lost me. 100% a Merkel-mess?

        * was it Merkel who allowed Greece to become (by far!) the EUs least attractive place to do business (World Bank) and the most corrupt one as well (TI)?
        * was it Merkel who allowed since EU-entry a gigantic transfer of wealth from Greek tax payers to non-tax payers (inluding the Church)?
        * was it Merkel who transferred the billions and billions of Euro from Greece to bank accounts abroad?
        * was it Merkel who spent 280 BEUR in net new foreign debt from 2001-10 on consumption instead of investment?

        This is not the time to assign guilt because that hinders finding solutions, as the last 2 years have shown. But if you do assign guilt, do it right!

      • Klaus:

        I did it right. 100% Merkel premeditated crime.

        Just read the Wall Street Journal article I just posted. The article is just a compilation of facts regarding the German intention not to help Greece, but punish her.

        This torture was meant as an example of avoidance for others. Now it’s our turn to torture Germany a bit, so that Germany creates a negative association with the torture business.

        Don’t worry. Our disciplinary action will be up to German standards. :-)

      • Dean. No one can punish Greeks more than some Greeks (hopefully still the minority) have punished the others (hopefully still the majority). Read this.

        http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite3_1_17/04/2012_438049

      • Klaus:

        Alexis Papahelas (the article writer you quoted) went to the same school as Samaras and Papandreou (Athens College, or as we know it in Greece the American college). Nothing wrong with the school, in fact one of the best, but the entire elite of Greece went through the same school, the same elite you seem to despise and calling urgently for its removal.

        As you know I supported a Samaras single party government (not a coalition) in this election for strategic reasons I have been explaining for the last 2 weeks or so in Nick’s blog.

        P.S. I went to a far better school called Lycee Leonin (which is the French equivalent of the Athens College) :-) . As a result, there is no way that I would subordinate my own perceptions of reality to those Papahelas and allow him to shape my opinions. His opinions are good and I like the man, but (how shall I put it delicately) I know better. And since Nick (the blog owner here) works also in the same newspaper and news organization as Mr. Papahelas, let’s try to keep the peace here before you accidentally ignite a new civil war in Greece as to what the best private school in Athens is. :-)

        http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexis_Papahelas

      • Dean, your school is definitely an excellent one because it seems to train people to immediately retreat to the “big picture” when uncomfortable specifics come up. I was trained similarly but then I worked 18 years with/for common-sense Mid-Westeners and their discussion-stopper was always: “Klaus, are you trying to get AT something or AROUND something”. Here is what I am trying to get AT:

        The answer to Greece’s problems is new jobs. Jobs which are good enough to allow their holders a decent living while still paying tolerable income taxes. Jobs which create profits for the employers so that they can pay tolerable corporate taxes and so that their owners can pay tolerable taxes on dividends. Can we agree on this?

        Perhaps I missed it but I didn’t hear any discussion of this during the recent campaign.

        So how can one get those jobs? My unwavering argument is that this question is what every discussion should be about. And here people are likely to have different views (ideologically or not).

        My view is that such jobs cannot be created by mandate. If they are, they will not last. If you borrow money to create non-lasting jobs, they are gone when the money flow stops.

        Such desirable jobs must “come into existence in the interplay between customer needs and suppliers’ capabilities”. Then they last as long as there are customer needs and suppliers’ capabilities. Then they can be financed by debt, too.

        Debt is never the primary problem. It all depends what it is used for. Tell me specifics where and by whom proposals were made how to use debt to create lasting new jobs! You know my proposals: start with import substitution (works immediately!), follow with export expansion, attract foreign investment and get a branding campaign going (supported by facts!) which starts giving people hopes and perspectives again. That’s the short-term tactical plan and that gains you time to work on the much more complex long-term strategic plan.

        Here is my request to you: please don’t respond by saying that Greeks would have done all that if only Merkel had not embarked on her vicious plan to kill Greece!

      • Klaus:

        I forgot for a second that you are perhaps humorless, as the stereotype demands it.

        As far as my background (even my CV) is concerned just Google my name. It’s all in there in spades.

        Regarding the action plan for Greece, forgive me but I will not discuss it in blogosphere. Rest assured that I know exactly what needs to be done and have the skills to implement it with surprising speed, effectiveness and efficiency.

        I could tell you the plan but then I will have to “kill you”. It’s classified. :-)

        BTW, that the Greek problem is mainly economic is precisely the German propaganda. The Greek problem is 70% political (and EU external based) and 30% economic (domestic based). Focusing on 30% of the total problem is not part of my executive training and experience. Only zooming on 100% of the problem will suffice for me.

  9. On the contrary, I doubt that Merkel or any external ‘enemy’ guided Greek choices at the ballot box last Sunday. In times of actual or figurative war, people tend to join forces against the identified enemy. In this case, this ought to have translated into a resounding victory for anti-Memorandum parties – including Communist KKE, which in fact didn’t make significant gains. Now, SYRIZA and Independent Greeks did spectacularly well, but even without the electoral law gimmick that grants the top party 50 seats, they’d probably still have failed to achieve a parliamentary majority, supposing they joined forces, of course.

    To my mind, Sunday’s result is pretty clear in the sense that it reflects the kind of fragmentation (as opposed to solidarity) that often follows what could be described as social and political degeneration. A society that had been voting overwhelmingly for this particular brand of PASOK and this particular brand of New Democracy for decades can’t have been healthy at heart and in mind, not least because of the clientelistic mentality and practices it fostered.

    It’s not that surprising that, under such relentless pressures, both external (the Troika, the ratings agencies, the markets) and internal (a suddenly tangible deficit, the very real problem of uncontrolled immigration – including the related, as real problem of Golden Dawn’s unprecedented rise) Greece has shattered. Whether on the surface or right down to its core, it remains to be seen.

  10. Fini67:

    The fragmentation is tactical not strategic.

    The Art of War dictates that when you face superior forces you do not meet the enemy frontally for a final, decisive battle. You fragment, split up and begin to harass, irritate and strike the enemy on a consistent basis and at a time and place of your own choosing.

    Such tactics/principles of conduct are well known and universally accepted.

  11. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304203604577393964198652568.html?KEYWORDS=greece

    “Mr. Papandreou says that when he asked German Chancellor Angela Merkel for gentler conditions in 2010, she replied that the aid program had to hurt. “We want to make sure nobody else will want this,” Ms. Merkel told him.

    Greece’s economy has already shrunk by 14% in the past three years, and IMF officials privately expect a further 6.5% contraction this year. Something has to give, and it could be the boundaries of the euro.

    Europe fears that a Greek exit from the euro could spur massive capital flight from Portugal, Spain or other struggling euro members. Some European officials argue privately that the euro could cope with a Greek exit because markets understand that Greece’s debt crisis is uniquely severe.

    Others worry that by triggering runs on banks and government-bond markets it could endanger the currency itself. That would present Germany and Europe’s north with a terrible choice: to watch the centerpiece of Europe’s decades of political integration collapse or to rush into a deeper fiscal union, including common bond issuance, to save the euro.”

    …….

    “Germany said no: Structural reforms would take place at the same time as drastic austerity to bring down the budget deficit—15.8% of gross domestic product in 2009—to under 3% by 2014. The timetable proved unrealistic: Spending cuts and tax increases pushed the economy into such a deep recession that the deficit got stuck at around 10% of GDP.

    Usually when the IMF imposes austerity, it makes a country devalue its currency, in the hope its cheaper exports will offset falling domestic demand.

    But Greece no longer has a currency of its own to devalue.”

  12. Dean, I’ve got to hand it to you: every time I think I have you in a spot where we could discuss specifics, you find a wonderfully creative way to escape that. Your school must really be a very, very good one! My own school (Harvard) taught me never to duck questions. If people are reading our ping-pong, they probably see me as the fellow who wants to catch a fish with his bare hands but the fish always escapes. Anyway, you say you know what needs to be done and you have the skills to do it. All I can tell you is: there is a job opening in Athens and you might want to go for it!

    • o.k. Klaus. I understand.

      But as far as I know, Athens doesn’t even known I exist. Let alone in handing me a job that has someone else’s name on it.

      If I were to take the job in Athens it would be a very sad day for Merkel. It might be a great day for Europe but a very uncomfortable day for those unqualified to hold positions of leadership in Europe. I am a no-nonsense guy and my leadership would be both firm and far reaching. You may want to reconsider and formally withdraw my name before such calamity befalls on Germany, Austria and other such states of common heritage. :-)

      P.S. I’ve heard of Harvard. Where is it? :-)

      • I would like to invite both of you over for an ouzo and mezedakia. I think it would be a fun evening and you might even solve the world’s problems. :P

      • O.k. Heidi, you got an important element right.

        We have to be slightly drunk to zoom into the solution because it’s not self-evident. :-) Anytime and I will bring the wine also.

        Cheers to both!

    • No, Klaus: Seriously now.

      You are asking me to provide for free a solution that is worth billions to Greece and Germany and trillions to world markets.

      Professionals don’t work that way.

      There are excellent (highest and best) solutions for Greece. The key is to calibrate properly for local conditions and the Greek character.

      • Dean, you are certainly very creative but your creativity is nothing compared to the one of this Greek!

        http://klauskastner.blogspot.com/2012/04/greek-ingenuity.html

      • Klaus:

        You are good man, despite what I say about you.

        I know you want to help because of family reasons and such is appreciated.

        But unless the solution is packaged right it can’t be bought by the most important stakeholders: The Greek people. Trust me on this. It’s not a slippery effort to avoid responsibility. It’s common sense. Greeks must be convinced that it’s about them and their own good. Such effort has not been undertaken yet. “Fear + end ends” are not not the way to go. The way to do it is for all citizens to buy in.

  13. Dean, since you have probably classified me as some neoliberal capitalist, it may surprise you that I have very nice things to say about Alexis Tsipras.

    http://klauskastner.blogspot.com/2012/05/cheers-for-alexis-tsipras-and-more.html

    • Klaus:

      Very nice of you to support Tsipras. I don’t think he is what Greece needs at the moment. He is a “mini me” version of a modern Alcibiades. Casting a vote for empty shells is out of the question for me.

      BTW, I don’t have a fan’s approach to politics. I don’t support factions or classifications based on labels. I only ask: can this guy do the job?

      The answer in Tsipras’ case is a resounding NO. He has neither the experience nor background to lead Greece at the moment. He is enjoying a free ride which will end soon.

      Tsipras is more Merkel’s problem (since her brand of politics spawned him together with the Greek neo-Nazis) than mine. Tsipras is what physics call an equal reaction to an applied force. Nothing more, nothing less. As soon as Merkel ceases to apply pressure, Tsipras is a goner.

      Likewise, I don’t judge you on your brand of politics. I only ask: Can any of Klaus’ suggestions help? If, yes then your ideas are included in the package. If no, I kindly ask you to try again.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s